First Sport Aviation Magazine...

[David Pavlich]

I just received my first publication of Sport Aviation Magazine. Really good stuff! I've read it from cover to cover and thought I'd comment on the very first article, Bending The Safety Curve keeping in mind that I have yet to take my first lesson. I am in 100% agreement that teaching safety, not over regulation is the proper way to reduce GA accidents. But, there is something else that needs to be covered and that's how do you rid pilots of the ilogic of making marginal to poor decisions when to fly or how to fly?

I read four abreviated accident reports in AOPA's Flight Training. A brief description of the accidents:

1. Ran out of fuel, no flight plan filed and flew over 5 airports before landing in a field and flipping.
2. Flying very low in mountainous terrain and crashing into the side of a mountain.
3. Landing too hot (Columbia 350) and crashing into several parked airplanes causing a fire that destroyed three planes.
4. Leaving at dusk for a 210 nm trip in IMC and crashed into a wooded area.

No survivors. There was no mechanical malfunction. It was nothing but poor decisions. So...is there an answer? I don't get it. From what I've read here, you guys don't do this sort of thing or if you have, you're either really good or really lucky. Am I being too selective or is it that the majority of GA accidents are the fault of bad decisions?

David

[Frank Giger]

Funny, I was going to make a thread about what a great issue it was - here was something that really appealed and applied to the "big tent" aviation membership of the EAA.

David, from what I can suss out from all the wreck reports is that the vast majority are due to the bad luck generated through bad decisions.....and usually it's just not one bad decision, but a chain of smaller ones that snowball.

Didn't do the right maintenance, skimped on the pre-flight of the aircraft, didn't seriously look at pre-flight planning past lines on a map, didn't hang up the flight when things got bad - or put saving the aircraft above the squishy bits inside it (turning back to a runway on takeoff for a stall-spin rather than going for an off-airport landing).

The problem is that the consequences for working the accident chain is much higher for airplanes than other modes of transportation. The best pilot in the world has only to take the wrong decision path once to wind up dead; in automobiles, in contrast, if one screws up it's usually surviveable and often without injury.

The other problem is that the kind of pilot who really looks at NTSB reports, reads safety articles and goes to the FAAST presentation is most likely already part of the choir.

[Floatsflyer]

There was no mechanical malfunction. It was nothing but poor decisions. So...is there an answer? I don't get it.

David

Unfortunately, we can't legislate or regulate stupidity, neglect or carelessness in any activity we humans undertake, let alone flying. The only answer I can think of is contained in 3 tried and true adages applied to aviation since the very beginning of flight. If you adhere to them you will minimize the possibilities of self-inflicted harm and maximize the joy and exhileration of the freedom of flight:

One, flying in and of itself is not inherently dangerous, however it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.

Two, continue to learn from the mistakes of others, you will not live long enough to make them all yourself.

Three, in flying, it is indeed considered a strength to be fastitious and anal.

[zaitcev]

I think the issue here is that risks have to be taken in personal airplanes in order to get anywhere. The question is in the balance of risk. For example, every time you fly night VFR in a single your risk of engine failure stays the same, but the risk of fatality goes way up near to 100%. Well, what to do? You could never fly at night, if you want. Or you could accept the risk.

Note that any activity carries a risk. More people die from accidents in their homes than die from firearms (including suicides!).