It is interesting seeing some new ideas such as multiple arrivals, though it might be some effort to reconcile that with other arrivals separate from the Fisk VFR procedure. Also agree that ATIS didn't keep us updated on conditions; that might take a little more effort from ATC to keep it real-time, but would be quite valuable. In my previous visits, ATC was very good about keeping the pre-Ripon traffic updated. While many would likely agree that pilots not conforming to the arrival procedure made a challenging situation worse, I think there are one or two things the NOTAM and ATC could change to mitigate the difficulties. I thought about this for a while after our 2-hour Sunday arrival adventure and contacted EAA to send feedback, not appreciating that many others had, too, and that EAA was already convening a group to consider the situation. To their credit, they contacted me back, cc'd some senior names and gave me the opportunity to pen the following note. Am I missing something or is there a gap in either the NOTAM or ATC instruction on how to handle planes kicked out after Ripon?

My feedback is about our experience on the arrival at approximately 1:30-3:30pm, Sunday, July 22. My concerns relate primarily to system operation efficiency with secondary effects on airspace safety. I realize the weather Friday and Saturday helped create a heavy backup of aircraft attempting to arrive Sunday which was likely to saturate even the most well-designed procedure.
The primary item is: The NOTAM does not describe, and ATC did not explain, what airplanes ejected from the Ripon-to-Fisk segment should do.

Heavy traffic and pilots failing to provide the requested spacing (2 miles, for most of our time on the arrival) kept that segment clogged. When ejected, ATC simply instructed aircraft to "turn left, go back and try again". These pilots returned directly to Ripon, repeating the same spacing errors. Dozens of aircraft were stuck in the Green Lake hold with no way to enter at Ripon due to saturation and ATC did not update the holding aircraft on hold status. ATC kept the frequency nearly constantly open talking to the Ripon-Fisk segment traffic causing difficulties, so holding aircraft had no opportunity to ask. Holding traffic got tired of holding with no information and attempted to enter, making the saturation worse. It was unclear to me whether the hold was officially active at any time during our arrival. Even the few times ATC announced that all arrivals were stopped, there was no instruction for Ripon-to-Fisk traffic to enter either hold, and they appeared to continue re-entering at Ripon.

The safety impact was that aircraft turning left from the Ripon-Fisk segment and returning to Ripon were, albeit briefly, approaching holding traffic head-on before turning toward Ripon again. For some reason, a number of those aircraft were descending from higher altitude while turning back in, not ideal for low-wings descending into opposite direction traffic. These seemed to be mostly RVs in tight spacing, perhaps attempting to land as flights? Another safety impact was the increasingly dense saturation at Green Lake and near misses. All of this led to frustration among some pilots, which affects their situational awareness and decision making. Add in the usual inattention to merging and failing to maintain altitude/speed requirements, and the Green Lake area got dicey.

Potential mitigations might include:

  • Whether the NOTAM should have a procedure to address such situations, or whether ATC should be briefed on specific instructions for ejected aircraft. e.g., enter the Rush Lake hold, re-enter Green Lake hold to establish spacing before entering Ripon again, etc.
  • Specific ATC instructions prohibiting flights when congestion is a problem and aircraft are failing to maintain requested separation.
  • Periodic guidance/reminders to traffic not yet at Ripon, such as whether holding is active and to establish spacing prior to entering at Ripon.


There are various considerations for the different re-entrance options for Ripon-Fisk ejections, including challenges integrating traffic streams, unintentionally prioritizing bad actors, and inadvertently punishing pilots unlucky to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. The solution may be very simple – improving communication to set specific expectations.

Thank you again for taking the time to consider these thoughts. I should add that, problems aside, we do appreciate the monumental task EAA and ATC take on to craft and operate a system that handles a staggering number of aircraft – and pilots of varying competence – and generally works well.