AOPA Webpage fatal accident study

[Joe LaMantia]

I haven't watched the video, but based on the comments above, it's clear this guy either didn't have a set of "Personal Minimums" or just ignored them. The day I got my license (1993) my instructor reminded me of the minimums he set for me during my cross-country training. We talked about the "License to Learn" and I set 3500 feet and 5 miles as my minimum for departing my home base pattern. I plan my cross-countries keeping those minimums and create a "trip book" with all the airport facility guides that cover my route. As I fly along I will dial up the AWOS frequencies to stay alert to the weather ahead. VFR pilots should be looking at the big picture regarding weather for several days before any planned cross-country. You just can't have too much information regarding fronts, cloud cover, winds aloft, temperatures, and pressures. I would not fly a long cross-county at or near my minimums, I look for improving conditions along my route or just wait until the weather move out. I am familiar with the area west of O'Hare, there is a VFR "corridor" through the west side of that class B airspace that passes about a half mile east of DuPage. You can get an ATC clearance through there "at or below 2500" and will be instructed to contact DuPage tower before entering that airspace (Class D). I know of no low level obstructions in the area, but it is a well "developed" urban landscape, and if your going to fly through any Class B airspace you should have a Terminal Chart along and hopefully have reviewed that chart before departing. There are a lot of airports along that route which takes you north through the Class B to Wisconsin. It is really sad to hear of yet another avoidable accident killing a family.

Joe

[steveinindy]

One more thing on this subject......That CFI whom helped him plan this trip......Shame on you.....Your hands are not clean, you where a part of this....This CFI should have stopped this flight before they even fueled the bird.

This {CFI} man or woman knew this man was not rated for IMC and also this person {CFI} knew enough to know the conditions on a day like that can change in min's from VFR to IFR....Poor decision making on the CFI's part since this man {Pilot} asked for help in planing this trip.

Agreed. I know the CFI in question (not well, but I know who it is as we have mutual friends) and have given them a similar earful via a mutual friend. The message consisted of a reminder that I hope the figurative blood never washes off the hands of those who did not have the courage to speak up and try to stop this flight. Hopefully the CFI will use this case as what happens when you think technology is a substitute for being a competent pilot. Cockpit glass is no more of an excuse for shoddy flying than flaps, shock absorber equipped landing gear or seatbelts are.

I told him fly a single seater for about 500 hrs before thinking about getting a dual seat or two seater.

Agreed. However, I believe it should be two fold.

One should have quite a few hours (at least a couple of hundred) in something without an autopilot before stepping into something that does have one. Likewise, one should have a hundred or so hours in type before hauling passengers unless you have a specific full type rating for that aircraft and are flying dual pilot.

Even as a person who is designing an aircraft with enough "glass" to make a Cirrus look like a Taylorcraft, I still realize that what makes one a pilot is the skills you keep sharp for the times when the chips are down and not what you are flying. I can't stand hands on cruise flight (I find it about as appealing as the idea of stabbing myself in the eye with a rusty shrimp fork) but I still do it because I need to keep those skills up since my passengers rely upon me. I don't like aerobatics and prefer to keep the airplane dirty side down but I still go and seek out unusual attitude training because the lives of those who put their faith in me may rely upon it.

I guess the fact that even with 250 or so hours, one would think that his judgement should have been on the side of caution and was not is what perplexes me. Ego? Not wanting to disappoint? We'll never know.

Part of it goes to the market that Cirrus selects to focus on even though it makes sense from an economic standpoint. You look at doctors, lawyers, engineers and higher end business types. You don't often get there by being overly cautious or excessively risk averse. Most of them are severe Type-A personalities and are loathe to admit when they are in over their heads. Combine that with a marketing scheme that consists largely of "This plane can do anything an airliner can do so you will get where you're going and fast" and the end result is somewhat predictable.

[Bill Greenwood]

As for the CFI, I don't know how much blame, if any, he has. At 207 hours the pilot has the legal qualfications to plan and make his flights, and may not take well to any negative advice. We don't know how much planning help the CFI was asked for, and in any case the weather got worse in route. I doubt if the CFI told him to continue flight into IMC conditions if they were encountered.

There are two other psychological matters, at least. The fllgiht school would be motivated to rent the plane, but they would hope to have it back at the end of his time in order to rent it to the next guy. Perhaps that is why he said that he didn't want to get stuck somewhere, he was worried about getting the plane back in time. Of course the school would much prefer him to land safely somewhere, even if they had to send another CFI down to retrieve the plane, or wait till the next day for him to fly back.
He was really reluctant to take the suggestions of the controller to fly to PWK where it was decent vmc weather. I suspect that he feared entering the Class B (TCA) airspace that is over that area, and that is why he turned NW and into worsening weather.. The difficulty went on for some time, it was not an instantaneous emergency, and it could and should have been handled.
ATC even offered flight following. If he accepted it they could have given him a heading and a clearance with a transponder code and he could have flown to VMC conditions at Palwaukee, and probably landed safely. Instead he mumbled some babble that made no sense and wandered off into worse weather.

I think there may be some truth to what Steve says about Cirrus marketing. They have done a good job of getting people interested in these planes that may have not come up through the normal learning route. But the downside it that a mindset may be there which overlooks or downplays that is light gen aviation, there are many times when you just can't go or at least should not persist in a flight.Type A may work well for fullbacks and linebackers,but not so well for pilots. There are, of course many doctors and lawyers that are fine pilots, my orthopedic doctor is a partner in the FBO here and is a former Navy doctor as well.

The shame is that while this short flight would have been a fun way to get the daughter to school, it was not in any way vital. They could have driven the 200 mile trip in under 4 hours.

[steveinindy]

As for the CFI, I don't know how much blame, if any, he has. At 207 hours the pilot has the legal qualfications to plan and make his flights, and may not take well to any negative advice. We don't know how much planning help the CFI was asked for, and in any case the weather got worse in route. I doubt if the CFI told him to continue flight into IMC conditions if they were encountered.

Legally, no blame there but at least the CFI should have verbally dressed him down for thinking about this flight especially with passengers on board. It would be one thing if he were instrument rated and considering a marginal VFR flight. It's entirely another when you have a VFR only rookie pilot. To me it is no different than telling someone that they can take off with an active oil leak if they agree to land if the engine seizes. You might not stop him but you have a moral obligation to watch out for fellow pilots and if nothing else, at least you can have some defense for your own conscience by having tried to do the right thing.

They could have driven the 200 mile trip in under 4 hours.

I know for a fact that in the weather the day of the crash, the drive from Indianapolis (about an hour south of the airport the flight departed from) to Woodstock, Illinois took three hours and thirty five minutes. I happened to have taken that drive that day for work and I pulled my records because I thought it might be helpful.

[David Pavlich]

Another thought...again, not to use electronics as an excuse for poor judgement but in this case, possibly prevent the accident. The Cirrus Perspective has a button on the center stack that is made for spatial disorientation. Press the button and the plane returns to straight and level flight. I don't know...I guess I'm trying to work my way through this and figure out how he could have gotten out of it. If anything, he should have been up with his instructor working on his IFR rating, not flying the mission that he did.

David

[1600vw]

This is what amazes me. Someone will get a few hrs under thier belt then want to fly loved ones around. Myself I will not fly any passengers until I get close to 1000 hrs.

Becuase of this and my age I will never fly anything but a single seater. If I do go up in a two seater or bigger, I am a passenger along for a ride. If I get a little stick time thats great, if not oh well.....This is just me....

I have a Motto I wish more would take on..It is.........I refuse to be a Statistic......

H.A.S.

[martymayes]

..I guess I'm trying to work my way through this and figure out how he could have gotten out of it.

David, the problem with that kind of thinking is there are no limits. If the pilot could extricate himself from inadvertent IFR, that would become routine thus allowing him to advance to the next level of hazards. What the pilot did was expand his envelope in a very undisciplined manner until he reached his level of incompetence, then crash. Frankly, I'm surprised he got this far.

[David Pavlich]

David, the problem with that kind of thinking is there are no limits. If the pilot could extricate himself from inadvertent IFR, that would become routine thus allowing him to advance to the next level of hazards. What the pilot did was expand his envelope in a very undisciplined manner until he reached his level of incompetence, then crash. Frankly, I'm surprised he got this far.

I completely understand your reply. For certain, he should have left the plane in the hangar. Unfortunately, he wasn't thinking, at least not clearly. This has been a great experience for me. I have yet to take my first lesson, yet it's like I've received terrific instruction without being in a classroom or a cockpit.

David

[steveinindy]

Press the button and the plane returns to straight and level flight.

I believe that system, like most, has limits so far as recovery from excessive pitch, roll and yaw is concerned and it is very easy to get disoriented and wind up beyond those limits before you realize you're actually in trouble. You also have to account for the panic that often accompanies an upset. The other issue is that a lot of pilots are hesitant to cede control in an emergency (or even under normal conditions) to "George". He probably thought he could recover right up until the moment he popped out of the bottom of the cloud a couple of seconds prior to leaving the sort of mark on history that those of us in the aviation safety community and a landscaper can fully appreciate.

If anything, he should have been up with his instructor working on his IFR rating, not flying the mission that he did.

Agreed. However, we need to get away from the "mission" mindset in GA. I think too many of us take our flying so seriously that we shut out other options (diverting or not launching at all) in order to complete the "mission". Nothing we do in GA is so important that we HAVE to do it which makes us different from the military-style mission mindset that traps so many of our colleagues.

David, the problem with that kind of thinking is there are no limits. If the pilot could extricate himself from inadvertent IFR, that would become routine thus allowing him to advance to the next level of hazards. What the pilot did was expand his envelope in a very undisciplined manner until he reached his level of incompetence, then crash. Frankly, I'm surprised he got this far.

Well said Marty.

[martymayes]

David, I don't want to bore you but I had an experience eerily similar to this one.

When I was a young CFI, I taught an 'older' gentleman (upper 40's, lol) how to fly. He had been passed from CFI to CFI, all out just to empty his wallet. None of them had any intention of letting him progress to first solo, so at 40 hrs of dual one CFI decided he needed a dual X-C.

Then I started flying with him. We started at the beggining. To say he was a challenging student is an understatement. But I got him to solo. Then another. Then I soled him on the requisite x-c flights. Then I prepped him and got him passed his checkride. After that we sat down and had a long talk. I "advised" him to avoid marginal wx conditions. Same with night. Fly only on good VFR days. Then I told him to stay in simple airplanes, those with only two seats. This was all based on my experience flying with him. I knew his weaknesses.

About 6 months later, he purchased a Cessna 172L. He wanted me to check him out in it. So I did. Older but well cared for plane. We parted ways and I gave him the same advice, good VFR only, >5000/5, no night, don't fill up the seats with passengers.

Well, one fall Sat. in 1983, he loaded up his dad, adult son and daughter and flew from Louisiana to College Station, TX for an A & M football game. (What is it with planes and football games?) They came back home around 7pm, very dark night due to low ceilings (BKN 007), light rain, reduced visibility. He ended up about 50 miles N. of where he should have been, recognized he was lost, circled, called for help, received assistance in the form of radar vectors but became spatially disoriented and crashed in a steep nose down attitude. There were no survivors.

The IIC told me that while his poor choices got him into a bad situation, he was doing everything right to get out of it -apparently he had a good CFI (his words). Unfortunately, he couldn't control the plane by reference to instruments long enough to end the flight successfully. I knew that would happen if he ever inadvertenly entered IFR for more than a couple minutes. Maybe I'm not such a good CFI after all.

So I have spent a lot of time over the years thinking what could I have done differently. Any ideas? Could this have been prevented?