EAA Safety Pledge?

[danielfindling]

Ok, I was inspired after reading an article in the recent issue of Kitplanes written by the founder of the Vans Air Force which addressed his personal minimums: e.g. No low level high speed flybys, no single engine night flying, no mass formation flying, an A&P does a look over after an oil change, . . .

Why doesn't EAA have a safety Pledge to help promote the safety of General Aviation? (If we have one, news to me)

Sure we have the FAR's but legal and safe are different.

It seems that the EAA is often engaged in a (justified) battle with the bias reporting of GA accidents. For example, if statistics are unfavorably reported by [fill in the blank], an article in Sport Aviation tackles the statistics as bias. When a blog about the dangers of air racing vs. airshows is published, it is removed when our members believe aviation is being thrown under the bus.

I propose EAA encourage more self regulation on flying and maintaining of home-built, warbird, vintage, and general aviation in addition to safety articles and tech counselors (e.g. http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa24.pdf)

How about an EAA safety pledge by members to (your SUGGESTIONS here) without fear that the pledge will become over burdensome Federal regulation etc. What do you think? Make it part of the EAA culture to: e.g. "Fly responsibly, courteously, and cautiously. Set personal minimums and abide by them, and promote EAA and general aviation . . ."

Here are some other examples?
The Academy of Model Aeronautics National Model Safety Code: http://www.modelaircraft.org/files/105.PDF
The National Association of Rocketry Safety Code: http://www.nar.org/NARmrsc.html

[Janet Davidson]

Nice idea, but as with a lot of things like this, those who listen & pledge are the ones who are least likely to need to listen & pledge. They have already taken the necessary steps in self awareness & safety.

[steveinindy]

"D**n it Janet" (sorry....couldn't resist), you beat me to it. I don't see any bias reporting against experimental versus non-experimental GA.

It seems that the EAA is often engaged in a (justified) battle with the bias reporting of GA accidents. For example, if statistics are unfavorably reported by [fill in the blank], an article in Sport Aviation tackles the statistics as bias. When a blog about the dangers of air racing vs. airshows is published, it is removed when our members believe aviation is being thrown under the bus.

I think the bias exists in the eyes of the reader of reports more often than whenever they read something with which they disagree with. It's much easier to scream "BIAS!" than to critically evaluate one's own activities. We do have some increased dangers and splitting hairs (excluding crashes from the test flight period for example; that's only valid if you split out the crashes of similar certificated aircraft in their first 40 hours of operations and compare them to the experimentals) like a lot of us do to make our numbers look better isn't valid statistical analysis on the face of an "apples to apples" standard. It goes back to that old Mark Twain quote about there being three kinds of liars: liars, d**n liars and statisticians.

If we go out with the intention of quashing discussion about the safety issues inherent in our chosen activity ("when a blog about the dangers of air racing vs. airshows is published, it is removed when our members believe aviation is being thrown under the bus") it makes us no better than those you are trying to blast for "bias". Bias is bias whether we choose to agree with it or not. How about scientifically valid arguments being the goal instead of simply making it be whether it serves our ends or not.

Instead of chasing the specter of "bias" how about we actually go after the activities that are causing experimental crashes to be so common. The two such issues that seem to be major problems are botched fuel system construction, installation or maintenance and cowboy behavior (high speed passes, untrained/uncoordinated formation flying, low altitude aerobatics, etc). Instead of splitting hairs and over-compartmentalizing our crashes to make them seem on par or better, let's expend that same energy actually making our aircraft and their use safer than their standard category counterparts.

[danielfindling]

Steve, I enjoyed your Rocky Horror reference.

I think EAA is doing something about home-built safety with the technical counselors etc. I was focusing on the pilot. After I purchased my airplane I read every fatal accident report to help me make better decisions when flying. How many deaths are caused by unintended flight into IMC?

I feel EAA could spend resources improving pilot saftey in aeronautical decision making in the culture of EAA (e.g. The pilot pledge) in lieu of attacking the messenger (the perceived or actual media bias). I believe that the ad hoc and ad hominem undertone of EAA (attacking the media messenger) does nothing to help GA or safety.

I can think of several forums at Airventure where the audience cheers when a speaker boasts of flying irresponsibly but few about staying alive in a single engine airplane. As an aside, I am a newly minted private pilot and I am trying not to hurt myself by developing my own personal pledge. After all, I have three young children and a wife and next to my family, I love flying.

Daniel

[steveinindy]

I think EAA is doing something about home-built saftey with the techincal counselors etc. I was focusing on the pilot.

Agreed. I was just saying we should do more as a community to try to correct or marginalize those pilots who are engaging in activities that are frankly unsafe (cutting corners during construction, making design modifications without recognizing the broader ramifications, utilizing substandard parts, etc)

I can think of several forums at airventure where the audience cheers when a speaker boasts of flying irresponsibly but few about staying alive in a single engine airplane

So can I. I flat out got up and walked out of one after hearing such behavior.

[rosiejerryrosie]

We would all benefit from more safe behavior and fewer aircraft accidents. AOPA and the FAASTeam folks are concentrating more and more heavily on safer flying and Aeronautical Decision Making. EAA would be well served to help promote their safety seminars, webinars and on line classes. I, for one, would be more than happy to sign a pledge to not kill myself or anyone else by doing something stupid. I would also pledge to point out to others if they are about to do something that is unsafe (if the pledge went that far).

[Bill]

Nice idea, but as with a lot of things like this, those who listen & pledge are the ones who are least likely to need to listen & pledge. They have already taken the necessary steps in self awareness & safety.

There is a significant portion of the experimental aviation community who view self awareness and safety as anathema.

I intended to build an RV-7 and had already purchased the RV-7 preview plans from Vans. As a participant in the VAF (Vans Air Force) I was intensely interested in the VAF community that I was about to join. There was one thread that convinced me to do something else and that thread was in response to a plea from Van himself for more attention to safety in order to improve the safety record of experimental aircraft.

While there was a lot of discussion, pro and con, about approaches to safety, one post, in particular, convinced me that I did not want to be part of the RV community. In its essence, this post about safety said that if you should happen to report anyone to the FAA for a flagrant safety violation, that you should carefully consider the possibility of retribution for that report. There wasn't even a response, one way or another, to this post. It is unimaginable, for me, to belong to a group that finds this viewpoint acceptable. I sold my RV-7 preview plans and am awaiting delivery of a quick-build kit for another popular experimental kit at the end of February. I have only the highest regard for Van himself, but some of the builders of his kits are incomprehensibly obtuse and will not accept that safety will benefit themselves and the rest of the experimental aviation community.

[Frank Giger]

Nice idea, but as with a lot of things like this, those who listen & pledge are the ones who are least likely to need to listen & pledge. They have already taken the necessary steps in self awareness & safety.

LOL, there is a lot of "preaching to the safety choir" at FAA safety seminars. The guys and gals that bother to attend are the types that are already thinking safety and wondering how to be MORE safe.

Personally, I'm a big chicken when it comes to flying. If I wouldn't play 18 pulling a cart on a golf course in the present weather I won't fly over it.

On homebuilts, I'll gently disagree with Steve's stance, even though I understand it. Occupational hazard; he looks at an aircraft and sees a wreck. As I build my plane I think in terms of why something will work - and then try to shoot it down; the decisions I've made that are off plans aren't compromises but a different approach.

Usually it's an over-build of a part, though, and I talk to the designer of my plane about them.

On safety over all, I'll trust Randy Babbitt's observation that it's not the builder that usually wrecks, but the second or third owner of the experimental aircraft. That makes a lot of sense to me, as maintenance and inspections may be a mystery for a custom built aircraft.

I've put down some maintenance checks on areas that aren't intuitive on my list that will wind up in the POH based on build decisions and specific concerns I have based on being intimate with the construction. I'm not sure that most builders actually write down extra checks they know they need to make.

[edit]

When deciding on my aircraft, I did a bunch of research on safety not just for the particular model, but similar types - and not just in NTSB reports but on self-admitted incidents from pilots that didn't make the grade for FAA or NTSB involvement. Turns out they're really safe - one fatality that happened on the first flight takeoff due to PIO.

Ground straps coming loose, clogged fuel filters, and Ye Olde Ground Loop are the main culprits; owing to slow speeds and the tendency for tube and gusset construction to crumple make them amiable to pilot surviveability when making an opportunistic landing. Based on that, it pointed out some areas of specific concerns on my build.

[steveinindy]

On homebuilts, I'll gently disagree with Steve's stance, even though I understand it. Occupational hazard; he looks at an aircraft and sees a wreck. As I build my plane I think in terms of why something will work - and then try to shoot it down; the decisions I've made that are off plans aren't compromises but a different approach.

You're kind of correct on that. I actually look for something that is practical for the purpose it is intended and then try to figure out how to make it crash survivable. However, you are spot on when it comes to my tendency to look at any aircraft I see and try to figure out how it would react in various impact configurations. It's a quirk....humor me.

On safety over all, I'll trust Randy Babbitt's observation that it's not the builder that usually wrecks, but the second or third owner of the experimental aircraft. That makes a lot of sense to me, as maintenance and inspections may be a mystery for a custom built aircraft.

Then might I ask how that stands up to the standard "Once you get past the first forty hours..." response whenever safety of experimental aircraft is brought up. I would tend to agree that there is a secondary spike in accidents whenever pilots are transitioning from one aircraft (or class of aircraft) to another.

[Frank Giger]

On the first 40, I think it should be given a special notation to keep the data pure.

Test flights are, well, test flights. As a builder it would be much more useful for me to know what causes wrecks during testing versus what causes wrecks once it has been established the plane is "good to go," as one speaks to construction and the other to maintenance and design.

Let's say that Cessna had wrecked their first Skycatcher (which had a big EXPERIMENTAL decal on the side). Let's say they wrecked it three times as they found problems or the limits of the operating limitations (IIRC, there's a very good reason for why one should follow the INTENTIONAL SPINS SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED placard in them).

It probably would mean absolutely nothing to the safety of the production Skycatcher, assuming that they worked the bugs out.

However, those four wrecks would be listed in the experimental category and lumped along with the fellow that used substandard materials or techniques - or went from a C172 to a 3/4 scale Fokker Eindecker without proper transistion training.

In the homebuilt world, every single plane is a one off test platform! Some are less "testy" than others, like the RV's with pre-punched panels and if-it-doesn't-line-up-it-ain't-right design (which is why they have such a good track record), but one still has to remember the nature of the beast.

I know of at least one aircraft that wound up grounded permanently at the 20 hour mark because it was a monster to fly, and another that didn't make it to a hundred before it got hung from a museum ceiling for the same reason.

I want to know what problems are during testing (where they're expected) and what problems came later on.

Steve, I'm with you that we should definately be our own worst critics and that there is room for improvement on safety. Part of that should be stressing transition training, which also means reaching out to the larger GA community.

When I was in primary training in a FlightDesign CTLS and struggling through crosswind landings some wag at the airfield made some disparaging remarks about my less than stellar performance. Well, I took it in stride - man, I did everything but bend the bird!

The next week the same guy walked up and apologized to me. My instructor took exception to his comments and had him go around the pattern a few times after I left, and he learned the difference between a C172 and a twitchy little LSA first hand - and I gather it was a very sobering experience.

"If you can land that [censored] you can land anything," he said.

LSA transition training is one of the areas we're falling down on as well, but that's another thread....