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Steve, your objection to the FAA or FSDO, not being as through as the NTSB in accident report, is, to my way of thinking, a distincintion without a real operative difference, in many or our type of EAA accident.
It is a huge difference. This is probably one reason we find so many of the FAA handled crash sites wind up with "undetermined reasons" involved. If we are having problems with the engines or the fuel systems and it is going unrecognized then that significantly contributes to the prevention of crashes.
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This focus on design features, AFTER the crash is fine, but is different than trying to avoid the crash in the first place.
You have to do both. Because of the very nature of many experimental designers, builders and pilots, you'll probably never significantly reduce the human factors issues that lead to many crashes. We are simply all too often the "infallible alpha male" who doesn't want to think he can fail. I mean, the attitude is often "I built a **** airplane! I am the master of all things aeronautical!". Take a hard look at a lot of the folks we rub shoulders with and you'll see the dangerous attitudes that were so well discussed by Tony Kern in Darker Shades of Blue are frighteningly common.
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AND IT IS NOT A MATTER OF WHETHER THE EXACT FIGURE IS 800 % MORE OR ONLY 500 % MORE.
The bigger question is "What is really causing that disparity? Is it mostly truly human factors problems or are there flaws in either the designs or the execution of those designs?". If someone is doing a crappy job looking at the wreckage and doesn't really care, then you're getting false data.
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Maybe my writing was not clear, but nobody has come on this topic and said, Yes,we need to improve and here is a way to do it safer.
The problem is that when people make suggestions, those who will be effected by them tend to get really defensive and often hostile. That's one reason why I don't go over to VAF anymore. However, here are my recommendations towards preventing crashes.
1. Require a 'biennial' flight review or a 'test piloting for dummies' course and check ride immediately prior to beginning the flight test period
2. Revamp the FAA inspection process prior to issuance of the airworthiness certificate include provision of proof (such as a video tape, etc) showing the engine has been shown to work in both a nose high and nose low condition with the fuel tanks at low levels as well as full.
3. Require more stringent ground run requirements for modified or unproved engines. This would include many of the VW and Corvair conversions as an example. Every engine of this type should be treated as suspect until proven otherwise. Not that there is anything inherently wrong with the concept but one needs to be very certain that everything works like they believe it will before betting one's life and the reputation of general aviation and experimental aviation upon them. One of my friends is a very big advocate for them but advises that any such engine be built, inspected and tested "like you would a handled poisonous snake: very careful"
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I think,that to many, safety is a boring or uncool topic.It's like someone telling me to eat my veggies, and give up donuts. Even here on this EAA forum, we still don't have a category for safety, and if you go on the other Warbird forum there is not one either. I have made that suggestion on both sites and got nowhere.
The problem is that it's not so much considered boring or uncool but rather that it requires one to be introspective and self-critical.
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oh my goodness level of risk that the flawed FAA study tries to make us believe
You show me a study that isn't somehow flawed and I'll show you how you're not reviewing it intensely enough. No study is perfect but just because we don't like what the FAA has to say about us does not give us carte blanche to throw out the study and simply view it as "flawed". Not that I think you're suggesting that but we have to be careful using phrases like "flawed study" because people get the wrong impression when they aren't imbued with the ability to critically evaluate or the desire to vet what they are told.
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However, I'd bet a six pack that it is closer to reality than 800% that you refer to again and again in your posts as being the gospel truth.
No offense but if you seriously believe that then prove it in a way that doesn't include unrealistic exclusions of subsets of aviation etc.
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The NTSB investigators, and the FAA folks who also research the accidents, must just scratch their heads in wonder at the decisions some of the pilots have obviously made to get them into the predicament which has brought them to the site of the accident. What could be done to help change that decision making process?
I find that asking pilots (and their passengers) to sign medical/autopsy releases for use in crash survivability research when I see them about to do something exceptionally stupid (like the Cessna 172 pilot who was about to taxi out for takeoff in freezing rain as an example) tends to be a good way to make them reconsider their thought processes. However, I know this wouldn't work as a wider practice. Then again, if anyone wants to sign a release just in case, let me know. ;)